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November 23, 2004

Pentagon advisory group says:
The US is losing the war of ideas in the Muslim world

The United States is losing the war of ideas in the Muslim world as it has failed to explain its diplomatic and military actions to Muslims wary of American intentions, says the Defense Science Board Report.

The Pentagon advisory body report says the institutions charged with "strategic communication" stand broken, and calls for a comprehensive reorganization of the government's public affairs, public diplomacy and information efforts.

The report pointed out that "Muslims do not 'hate our freedom', but rather they hate our policies," adding Muslims object to "what they see as one-sided support in favor of Israel" and support for what they "see as tyrannies, most notably Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan and the [Persian] Gulf states," the panel's report says. Thus, talk about "bringing democracy to Islamic societies … is seen as no more than self-serving hypocrisy," it says.

The report warns that no public relations plan or information operation can defend America from flawed policies. "America's negative image in the world and diminished ability to persuade are consequences of factors other than the failure to implement communications strategies," says the 102-page report, completed in September.

The report compares the national security challenge of the post-9/11 world to the decades-long struggle against Communism. But the study then argues that the government's cold-war-era communications institutions have not understood that the Muslim world - and Muslim extremists - present different challenges.

The report scolds the government for casting the new threat of Muslim militancy in a way that offends most Muslims. "In stark contrast to the cold war, the United States today is not seeking to contain a threatening state empire, but rather seeking to convert a broad movement within Islamic civilization to accept the value structure of Western modernity - an agenda hidden within the official rubric of a 'war on terrorism'," the report states.

"Today we reflexively compare Muslim 'masses' to those oppressed under Soviet rule," the report adds. "This is a strategic mistake. There is no yearning-to-be-liberated-by-the-US groundswell among Muslim societies - except to be liberated perhaps from what they see as apostate tyrannies that the US so determinedly promotes and defends."

The Bush administration has portrayed the war in Iraq launched last year as a mission to bring democracy to that country in the hope that it could serve as a model to others in the Middle East. US intervention in the Muslim world, including wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, had actually elevated the stature of radical enemies of America, the report stated.

“In the eyes of Muslims, American occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq has not led to democracy there, but only more chaos and suffering. US actions appear in contrast to be motivated by ulterior motives, and deliberately controlled in order to best serve American national interests at the expense of truly Muslim self-determination,” the report stated.

The report also says: "The critical problem in American public diplomacy directed toward the Muslim world is not one of 'dissemination of information' or even one of crafting and delivering the 'right' message. Rather it is a fundamental problem of credibility. Simply, there is none - the United States today is without a working channel of communication to the world of Muslims and of Islam."

“If we really want to see the Muslim world as a whole and the Arabic-speaking world in particular move more toward our understanding of ‘moderation’ and ‘tolerance,’ we must reassure Muslims that this does not mean that they must submit to the American way,” the report stated.

The Defense Science Board report, which has not been released to the public, says the nation's institutions charged with "strategic communication" are broken, and calls for a comprehensive reorganization of government public affairs, public diplomacy and information efforts.

"America's negative image in world opinion and diminished ability to persuade are consequences of factors other than the failure to implement communications strategies," says the 102-page report, completed in September. "Interests collide. Leadership counts. Policies matter. Mistakes dismay our friends and provide enemies with unintentional assistance. Strategic communication is not the problem, but it is a problem."

The study does not constitute official policy, but it is described by the Pentagon's civilian and military leadership as capturing the essential themes of a debate that is now roiling not just the Defense Department but the entire United States government. The debate centers on how far the United States can and should go in managing, even manipulating, information to deter enemies and persuade allies or neutral nations.

There is little disagreement about the importance and utility of battlefield deception to help assure the success of a military operation and protect American or allied soldiers. But there is great concern among public affairs officials in the military at proposals for regional or even global information operations, especially if those efforts include falsehoods.

The rub is that in an environment of 24-hour news and the Internet, overseas information operations easily become known to the American people, and any specific government-sponsored information campaign not based on fact risks damaging the nation's overall credibility.

The Defense Science Board report, "Strategic Communication," proposes a permanent "strategic communication structure" within the White House National Security Council and urges elevated roles and responsibilities for a designated senior officer within other government organizations, including the State Department and the Pentagon. 

The Defence Science Board is made up of civilian experts appointed by the Pentagon, and offers the department advice on scientific, technical and other matters. There has been a debate inside the US Government on what actions are permissible in providing information intended to influence allies and foes alike.

In 2002, the Defence Department shut down its new Office of Strategic Influence after critics accused the department of creating a propaganda office to spread lies around the world under the premise of misleading US enemies.

Source: Media reports

Here are some of the highlights of the report:

Muslims don't want to be "liberated" by the US: Today we reflexively compare Muslim “masses” to those oppressed under Soviet rule. This is a strategic mistake. There is no yearning-to-be-liberated-by-the-U.S. groundswell among Muslim societies — except to be liberated perhaps from what they see as apostate tyrannies that the U.S. so determinedly promotes and defends. (p.36)

The US hasn't been "listening" to Muslims: We must begin by listening to that audience, because if we do not understand what resonates with them we have only a serendipitous chance of succeeding. Much of the current U.S. effort concentrates on delivering “the message” and omits the essential first step of listening to our targeted audiences. (p.38)

US policies have made things worse, not better: American direct intervention in the Muslim World has paradoxically elevated the stature of and support for radical Islamists, while diminishing support for the United States to single-digits in some Arab societies.
...
Therefore, the dramatic narrative since 9/11 has essentially borne out the entire radical Islamist bill of particulars. American actions and the flow of events have elevated the authority of the Jihadi insurgents and tended to ratify their legitimacy among Muslims. Fighting groups portray themselves as the true defenders of an Ummah (the entire Muslim community) invaded and under attack — to broad public support. (p.40)

The US is on the wrong side, supporting "authoritarian regimes": If there is one overarching goal [Islamists] share, it is the overthrow of what Islamists call the “apostate” regimes: the tyrannies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan, and the Gulf states. They are the main target of the broader Islamist movement, as well as the actual fighter groups. The United States finds itself in the strategically awkward — and potentially dangerous — situation of being the longstanding prop and alliance partner of these authoritarian regimes. Without the U.S. these regimes could not survive. Thus the U.S. has strongly taken sides in a desperate struggle that is both broadly cast for all Muslims and country-specific.
...
U.S. support of tyrannies in the Muslim World is perhaps the critical vulnerability in American strategy. It strongly undercuts our message, while strongly promoting that of the enemy. (pp. 35-6)

Policy, not the communication, is the real problem: America’s negative image in world opinion and diminished ability to persuade are consequences of factors other than failure to implement communications strategies. Interests collide. Leadership counts. Policies matter. Mistakes dismay our friends and provide enemies with unintentional assistance. Strategic communication is not the problem, but it is a problem. (p. 28)

On the importance of "credibility in the media battle": Information saturation means attention, not information, becomes a scarce resource. Power flows to credible messengers. Asymmetrical credibility matters. What's around information is critical. Reputations count. Brands are important. Editors, filters, and cue givers are influential. Fifty years ago political struggles were about the ability to control and transmit scarce information. Today, political struggles are about the creation and destruction of credibility. (p.20)

On addressing the roots of terrorism: The terrorism frame marginalizes other significant issues and problems: failing states, non-proliferation, HIV/AIDS pandemic, economic globalization, transnational threats other than terrorism, and global warming. Often the terrorism frame directs attention to tactics not strategy. The focus is more on capturing and killing terrorists than attitudinal, political, and economic forces that are the underlying source of threats and opportunities in national security. (p. 17)

An acknowledgement of a multi-faceted Islamic movement of "Restoration": We call it a war on terrorism ― but Muslims in contrast see a history-shaking movement of Islamic restoration. This is not simply a religious revival, however, but also a renewal of the Muslim World itself. And it has taken form through many variant movements, both moderate and militant, with many millions of adherents ― of which radical fighters are only a small part. Moreover, these movements for restoration also represent, in their variant visions, the reality of multiple identities within Islam. (p.35)

The Defense Science Board report was commissioned by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who in his letter to the Board's chairman about the project, in May 2004, made it clear that it is needed to pave the way for some expected future military adventures in the Muslim world. "Our military expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely to be the last such excursion in the global was on terrorism," writes Wolfowitz.